RFID Guardian Use-Cases Passport

From RFID Wiki

Many countries are planning to deploy RFID into their citizens' passports. This new kind of passport is often referred to as E-Passport or Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD). The aim for adopting e-passport is to carry biometric information in RFID tags and to prevent passport forgery. The e-passports will contain digital signatures, so while cloning an e-passport is easy, modi¯cation its contents is largely infeasible. Since e- passports include biometric information such as facial images, copying does not permit impersonation, and therefore system security is not undermined.

The basic interaction between readers and tags is called Basic Access Control. In this scheme, the reader ¯rst acquires the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) information from the data page of the passport, normally through a connected OCR scanner. MRZ is a standard for printing Optical Character Recognition (OCR) text. On a passport this information consists of the document holder's name, date of birth, gender, and the document's iden- ti¯cation number and expiration date. The reader then computes session key from MRZ information. Finally the reader and the chip embedded in the passport generate and exchange random numbers to create a shared triple-DES session key.

The main problem with Basic Access Control is that the MRZ informa- tion could be read by any one who have access to it, so its keys are not secure enough. This is because besides customer o±cials there are many others who can touch passports such as hotel clerks. Even if customer o±cials at the airport are trustworthy, are hotel clerks?

Some researchers therefore propose an enhanced scheme called Extended Access Control. Extended Access Control consists of two phases, Chip Au- thentication followed by Terminal Authentication. Extended Access Control makes use of Di±e-Hellman key pair and requires the reader to authenticate to the tag, thus ensures no sensitive information is leaked to illegal readers.

UML Object Model

UML Sequence Model

Sample ACL

context trusted;

#####################
# Passport Rules
#####################

# By default, we would leave RFID traffic alone
rule P15693 ACCEPT
{
	context = *;
	role = *;
	tags = *;
	query = { command = *; };
};

# Generally speaking, we would deny others to read my passport
rule P15693 DENY
{
	context = *;
	role = *;
	tags = @MY_TAGS;
	query = { command = *; };
};

# We allow border-check and police readers to read
rule P15693 ACCEPT
{
	context = trusted;
	role = LEGAL_READER;
	tags = @MY_TAGS;
	query = { command = *; };
};